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CONSTITUTIONAL FIG LEAVES IN ASIA
Po Jen Yap †
Abstract:
Constitutional landscapes in Asia are littered with fig
leaves. These proverbial fig leaves are legal principles, doctrines, and theories of
interpretation that judges appeal to when resolving constitutional disputes. This article
uncovers and examines three constitutional fig leaves that are prevalent and flourishing in
Asia: 1) formalism and its conceptual variants; 2) the exercise of judicial review that is
merely symbolic; and 3) the invocation of vacuous constitutional doctrines. This article
further argues that judicial recourse to fig leaves is not intended to deceive anyone about
what courts are doing; the fig leaves are on public display merely to demonstrate that
judges accept the role they are expected to play within their political systems. For better
or worse, it would appear that Asian judges believe that these fig leaves are necessary to
legitimize their actions, and, insofar as Asian judges are doing very little, these legal loincloths are vital to preserve judges’ modesties.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutional landscapes in Asia are littered with fig leaves. The
proverbial fig leaves referred to herein are the legal principles, doctrines, and
theories of interpretation that judges appeal to when they resolve
constitutional disputes. But in the post-legal-realism world that we live in
today, we have all come to accept that many of the legal techniques judges
purport to apply are merely rhetorical devices by which they seek to cover
their true motivations. This is so in the West and, as this article explores, it
is also true in Asia. 1
Asian judges, like many of their Western counterparts, would have us
believe that adjudication is merely a mechanical affair that involves applying
the law to the facts of a specific case. In so doing, judges seek to offer us
hope that the law can truly be separated from politics, and judges merely
follow pre-determined rules and exercise little discretion when making
decisions. 2 This is true of the (more) liberal or active courts that exist in
Hong Kong, India, and Taiwan, and it is equally applicable to the
conservative or passive courts in Malaysia and Singapore.
†

(Dr.) Po Jen Yap; Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong. The author is grateful for all the
comments provided by Cora Chan, Rosalind Dixon, Christopher Forsyth, Michael Hor, Eric Ip, Theunis
Roux, and Mark Tushnet. All errors are the author’s own.
1
See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); Martin Stone,
Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (Jules Coleman
& Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine,
the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122 (1996).
2
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory
Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001).

422

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 3

For the liberal courts in Asia, their reform-minded judges
understandably need legal fictions to protect themselves from the maelstrom
of politics when they hand down constitutional decisions that may incur the
government’s displeasure and/or public outrage. Insofar as these judges can
point to the Constitution, they can (hopefully) deflect any accusations that
they have intentionally interfered with the legislative prerogatives of the
political branches of government.
But conservative courts in Asia need their legal fictions too. The
political reality is that in both Singapore and Malaysia, the State has been
governed by the same ruling party or coalition since each nation’s
independence and will be so governed for the foreseeable future. 3 More
significantly, both countries have experienced judicial crises, which have
cast a pall over the state of constitutional review. In Malaysia, two Supreme
Court judges, one of whom was the Lord President, were impeached and
removed based on trumped-up charges in 1988.4 In Singapore, the judiciary
was equally shaken after Parliament passed a series of constitutional and
statutory amendments—which ousted the judicial review of executive
decisions taken under the Internal Security Act—within a month of the
Court of Appeal’s ruling. In that decision, the judges held that they would
henceforth objectively review the President’s exercise of his discretion to
detain persons under the impugned Act. 5 Where legislative and executive
power is consolidated by a semi-permanent party or coalition, the dominant
political entity in question can display its displeasure more easily, either by
eliminating judicial review or even ousting the judges themselves.6 Judges
operating in such political systems are not oblivious to this fact. Due to
3
The same political coalition, the Alliance Party, has ruled Malaysia since independence. The
Alliance Party was renamed Barisan Nasional (National Front) in 1974. The People’s Action Party has
been the ruling party in Singapore since its independence and the party has controlled over 90% of the
elected seats in Parliament since 1968.
4
The Malaysian judicial crisis of 1988 was sparked by a letter that Tun Salleh, the Lord President
of the Supreme Court of Malaysia (now re-titled Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Malaysia), wrote to
the King on March 26, 1988 about the judiciary’s concern over its deteriorating relationship with the
government. (Back in 1987, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad had expressed his
displeasure, on several occasions, over various decisions of the Malaysian courts.) Unfortunately, the King
was offended by the letter as he believed the royalty would be drawn into a conflict with the government if
he intervened on the judiciary’s behalf. On May 1, 1988, in an audience with the Prime Minister, the King
conveyed his displeasure with the letter and asked for appropriate action to be taken against the Lord
President. As a result, the Lord President and another Supreme Court judge were eventually impeached
and removed. For a fuller discussion, see Andrew Harding, The 1988 Constitutional Crisis in Malaysia, 39
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (1990).
5
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR 132.
6
See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 82–83 (2003).
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external political constraints, judges likely feel compelled to rule in favor of
their government or at most rule against the government in modest ways.
But these judges, concerned about their own legitimacy in the public eye,
would also feel the need to convince the people that they are able to
discharge their judicial duties without fear or favor, even if they can
realistically achieve very little. Therefore, fig leaves are used by passive
judges to justify to the public that a pro-government result was inevitable as
it was merely mandated by the law, rather than the result of any judicial
capitulation to legislative and executive power.
This article uncovers and examines three constitutional fig leaves that
are prevalent and flourishing in Asia: 1) formalism and its conceptual
variants; 2) the exercise of judicial review that is merely symbolic; and 3)
the invocation of vacuous constitutional doctrines. One must note at the
outset that the fig leaves identified in this article are not consistently applied
in the jurisdictions surveyed, as judges in different countries rely on varying
types of fig leaves. For example, symbolic review is only applied by passive
judges in Malaysia and Singapore, while relatively liberal courts in India and
Taiwan do not appeal to formalism and its conceptual variants during
constitutional adjudication.
Recent literature on constitutional law has generally explored the
political climates within Asian jurisdictions that account for the strategic
behavior of their judges, but there has been no scholarly attempt to examine
the doctrinal devices or fig leaves (as termed in this article) that Asian
judges apply during constitutional adjudication. 7 In short, the current
literature explains why Asian judges behave strategically, but not how they
do so at a retail level in individual constitutional cases. 8 At the outset, one
should note that this article does not seek to make any Westphalian
assumptions about judicial review. Rather, the article’s central thesis is
premised on the common, accepted argument that in our globalized world
today, insofar as Asia has differed in its approach to human rights, this

7
See generally id.; Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian
Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 (2011); Thio Li-ann, Between Apology
and Apogee, Autochthony: The ‘Rule of Law’ Beyond the Rules of Law in Singapore, 2012 SING. J.L. STUD.
269; Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses in Politically Charged Cases: East Asian Experiences,
8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 885 (2010), Eric Ip, The Evolution of Constitutional Adjudication in the Chinese
Special Administrative Regions: Theory and Evidence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 799 (2013).
8
I have chosen to examine Asian jurisdictions that best illustrate my central arguments.
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distinction is “maintained not by ‘natural’ culture but by a will to differ.” 9
This applies to both lawmakers and judges. Therefore, there is nothing
inherently Asian about the choices that the judges have made; the repertoire
of fig leaves Asian courts appeal to is merely used to disguise the normative
choices made by their judges to override or succumb to domestic politics.
Finally, this article concludes by arguing that judicial recourse to these
constitutional fig leaves seeks not to deceive anyone about what the courts
are doing. The fig leaves are on public display merely to demonstrate that
judges accept the role they are expected to play within their political
systems. For better or worse, it would appear that some Asian judges
believe these fig leaves are necessary to lend legitimacy to their actions.
Insofar as judges are doing very little, these legal loin-cloths are vital to
preserve their modesties.
II.

UNCOVERING THE FIG LEAVES

A.

Formalism

Formalism refers to a belief that judges are able to deduce “objective
and apolitical legal answers from abstract legal rules, principles or
categories, without recourse to policy considerations.” 10 There are three
variants of formalism exemplified in Asian case law, and this article
explores them in turn.
i.

Principles/Policy Dichotomy

The first variant of formalism is the distinction judges draw between
legal principles (rights) and policy. The genesis of this dichotomy can be
traced to Professor Dworkin’s argument that a policy is a “standard that sets
out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic,
political, or social feature of the community,” 11 whereas a principle is a
“standard that is to be observed . . . because it is a requirement of justice or
fairness[.]” 12 The implication of this distinction is that the vindication of
legal principles falls within the province of the courts, while policy is a
matter exclusively for the legislature to decide. In the same vein, Professor

9

Simon Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L.J. 743, 748 (1996).
See also Michael Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and
Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998).
10
Jeff King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 OXFORD J.L.S. 409, 414 (2008).
11
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
12
Id.
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Jeffrey Jowell has been explicit about the distinct spheres of influence the
two branches of government occupy:
[L]egislative authority inevitably contains a wide area of
discretion to make social and economic policy, over which the
courts have no dominium. It is not for the judges to secondguess the legislature on utilitarian considerations of the social
good. Their role is strictly confined to the limited issue of
whether the various inherent elements of democracy have been
infringed by other branches of government and therefore cannot
be sustained. 13
This principle/policy dichotomy was expressly endorsed by the
Singapore Court of Appeal in Jeyeretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG. 14 In this
case, a private individual sought to bring judicial review proceedings against
the Singapore Government, alleging that its contingent financial loan to the
International Monetary Fund violated Article 144(1) of the Singapore
Constitution. 15 The Court ultimately rejected the applicant’s claim on the
basis that he had no locus standi to bring a suit in the first place as he, a
mere private individual, was “unable to assert any rights—private or
public—to the alleged breach of duty, . . . his claim is brought in the public
interest.” 16
More relevant here, the Singapore Court of Appeal explained that:
Suffice it to say that we see much value in maintaining the
Dworkinian policy/principle divide here; this finds expression
in the courts being concerned only with the individual’s rights
and interests, and not matters of public policy, which rightfully
remains in the remit of proper political process. 17
In the same vein, when the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Mat
Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Pendakwa Raya recently upheld the constitutionality
13
Jeffrey Jowell, Parliamentary Sovereignty Under the New Constitutional Hypothesis, PUB. L. 562,
578–79 (2006).
14
Jeyeretnam Kenneth Andrew v A.G. [2014] 1 SLR 345.
15
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 144(1). (“No guarantee or loan shall
be given or raised by the Government: (a) except under the authority of any resolution of Parliament with
which the President concurs; (b) under the authority of any law to which this paragraph applies unless the
President concurs with the giving or raising of such guarantee or loan; or (c) except under the authority of
any other written law.”).
16
Jeyeretnam Kenneth Andrew, 1 SLR 345 at [51].
17
Id. at [56].
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of the Sedition Act, which imposes criminal liability on the sale and
distribution of seditious publications, the judges were adamant that the
draconian nature of the law was not suited for judicial resolution. 18 As
observed by Justice Abdul Malik Bin Ishak for the unanimous Court: “The
question whether the impugned Act is ‘harsh and unjust’ is a question of
policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and therefore not meet for
judicial determination. To sustain it would cut very deeply into the very
being of Parliament.” 19
Lest one think that this judicial appeal to the principle/policy divide is
a rhetorical device applied only by conservative judges, liberal judges in
Asia have equally intervened and overturned social policies in the name of
vindicating rights. For example, in the landmark Hong Kong constitutional
decision of W v. Registrar of Marriages, the Hong Kong Court of Final
Appeal (C.F.A.), by a four-to-one majority, held that the pre-existing
statutory prohibition against post-operative transsexuals from marrying in
their acquired gender violated their constitutional right to marry. 20 In
contrast, the dissenting judge, Chan P.J., viewed the recognition of a postoperative transsexual’s acquired gender for the purpose of marriage as
involving a change in social policy, and, in his opinion, such changes should
be left to the legislature. As observed by Chan P.J.:
The role of the court is to give effect to a change in an existing
social policy, not to introduce any new social policy. The
former is a judicial process but the latter is a matter for the
democratic process. Social policy issues should not be decided
by the court. 21
The judicial bifurcation of principles/rights from policy, as examined
above, rests on a questionable but common assumption that courts merely
interpret legal principles or rights, while legislatures are supreme in their
exercise of policy, in particular over social policy. However, this distinction
between “principles,” or “rights,” and “policy” is untenable. Every allegedly
rights-infringing legislation stems from a social policy that lawmakers
sought to pursue. When the Malaysian legislature criminalizes the sale of
18

According to Section 3(1)(a) of the Sedition Act, a publication would have a seditious tendency if
it would “bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Government.” Sedition Act
(Cap 290, 2013 Rev Ed) s 3(1)(a).
19
Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v. Pendakwa Raya [2013] M.L.J. 1342, 114.
20
W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 90.
21
Id. at 192.
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“seditious” publications, it may be pursuing a certain social policy on public
order while concurrently carving away citizens’ right to free expression.
Similarly, when the CFA vindicates the constitutional right of post-operative
transsexuals to marry, the CFA has equally (and rightly) displaced the
government’s social policy on marriage. Thus, there is no self-evident way
by which one can delineate the domain of “rights” from “policy,” such that
courts should be stewards only of the former and not the latter. 22 Insofar as
judges appeal to this distinction, they are merely seeking refuge behind a
legal fig leaf. This convenient dichotomy allows Asian courts to justify their
activism when invalidating primary legislation, and/or their passivity in
allowing controversial statutes to stand, by asserting they have no choice in
the resolution of the matter at all, that is, that the judicial role mandates the
substantive outcome.
ii.

Originalism

Originalism, as a constitutional theory, presents itself as a resolution
to the tension between constitutionalism and democracy. Insofar as courts
only implement the original understanding of the constitution, judges
adjudicate in a democratically legitimate way, as they are merely enforcing
the original meaning of the constitutional text that was duly enacted by the
people via their representatives. 23 It is thus believed that originalism, as a
mode of constitutional interpretation, may best promote predictability and
also prevent illegitimate constitutional change under the guise of judicial
interpretation.24
This brand of originalism has been termed “hard originalism,” and is
largely defended by judges and scholars who seek to transform
constitutional law into a system of rules, such that judicial review becomes
more democratic by virtue of its connection to past judgments of the
constitutional framers. 25 Consequently, judicial discretion is also fettered
and legal predictability enhanced by this judicial reliance on historical
rulings. 26 Originalists often caution that if judges are allowed to stray from
22

Po Jen Yap, Defending Dialogue, PUB. L. 527, 539 (2012).
Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J.
JURIS. 255, 261 (2002).
24
See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 143–160 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
25
CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173 (1996).
26
See generally BORK, supra note 24; Scalia, supra note 24.
23
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the original understanding of the Constitution, they will be given free rein to
amend the Constitution, and therefore judges (non-elected officials) would
be imposing norms that the people have not accepted through their
democratically elected representatives. 27
An originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution was
explicitly endorsed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong v.
Public Prosecutor. 28 In that case, the accused was sentenced to death by the
trial judge under the Misuse of Drugs Act for trafficking 47.27 grams of
diamorphine, a controlled drug. On appeal, the accused argued that the
mandatory nature of the death penalty (MDP) imposed by the impugned
statute was not “in accordance with law” as required under Article 9(1) of
the Singapore Constitution, as the expression “law” enshrined under Article
9(1) excluded inhuman forms of punishment. 29 Accordingly, he argued he
could not be validly deprived of his life under the statute.
Specifically, counsel for the accused asked the Court to follow a series
of Privy Council decisions from the Caribbean States where the Law Lords
of the United Kingdom had overturned the MDP imposed by the respective
State laws. 30 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal flatly rejected these cases’
applicability. According to the Chief Justice for the unanimous court,
Singapore’s due process clause was based on its equivalent in the 1963
Malaysian Federal Constitution, which was likewise based on the 1957
Malayan Constitution drafted pursuant to the advice of the Federation of
Malayan Constitutional Commission chaired by Lord Reid (the Reid
Commission). 31 Unlike those foreign decisions, which involved
constitutions that expressly prohibited inhuman punishments, the Chief
Justice opined that the Singapore Constitution did not expressly include such
a prohibition. In his view, the fact that the Reid Commission did not
recommend an express prohibition against inhuman punishment, even
though such a provision existed in the European Convention on Human
Rights—an instrument that applied in all the British colonies (including
Singapore and Malaysia) prior to their independence—clearly illustrated that
27

See generally Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119 (1996).
Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2010] SING. C.A. 20.
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 9(1) (“No person shall be deprived
of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.”).
30
See generally Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 App. Cas. 235; Fox v. The Queen, [2002] 2 App. Cas.
284; R v. Hughes, [2002] 1 App. Cas. 259.
31
Singapore became a constituent state of Malaysia in 1963 and gained full independence as a
sovereign republic in 1965.
28
29

JUNE 2016

Constitutional Fig Leaves in Asia

429

the omission was deliberate and was not due to ignorance or oversight. 32
Furthermore, the Chief Justice noted that in 1969 the Singapore Government
had unambiguously rejected a proposal by Singapore’s Constitutional
Commission to initiate a constitutional amendment that would have
expressly prohibited the state imposition of inhuman punishment. 33
Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, it was “not legitimate for this
court to read into Art[icle] 9(1) a constitutional right which was decisively
rejected by the Government in 1969, especially given the historical context
in which that right was rejected.” 34 Ergo, the Court of Appeal espoused an
originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution and would in turn
only invalidate “legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not
possibly have been contemplated by [Singapore’s] constitutional framers as
being ‘law’ when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting
fundamental liberties.” 35
However, the espousal of “hard originalism” as the preferred theory of
constitutional adjudication in Singapore by the Court of Appeal in Yong Vui
Kong is not unproblematic. First, the text of Singapore’s Fundamental
Liberties Clauses, which include the due process clause, was not deliberated
upon by a Constituent Assembly of the independent state in question.
Instead, upon gaining independence from Malaysia in 1965, the Singapore
legislature simply made most Fundamental Liberties provisions found in the
Malaysia Federal Constitution applicable to Singapore via the Republic of
Singapore Independence Act. 36 Certainly, the fact that the legislature of a
newly sovereign republic consciously adopted those provisions conferred
upon these Singaporean liberties a legal life of their own. Mere enactment
of the law alone, however, does not provide a clue as to the original meaning
the framers of the Singapore Constitution attached to those provisions they
adopted. Furthermore, since the Singapore constitutional framers did not
deliberate upon the phraseology of the Fundamental Liberties Clauses, but
merely imported them as a matter of expedience from Malaysia, one does
32

Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [62].
The Singapore Constitutional Commission was tasked by the Singapore government in 1966 with
making recommendations on constitutional changes that might be necessary to protect the rights of
minorities in Singapore.
34
Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [72].
35
Id. at [16].
36
For example, the Singapore Parliament deliberately omitted to include Article 13 of the Federal
Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and provides for adequate compensation for
depreciation of this right. See generally KEVIN TAN & MIN-YEO THIO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 74 (2010); Kevin YL Tan, State and Institution Building Through the
Singapore Constitution 1965–2005, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE
CONSTITUTION 54 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin Tan eds., 2010).
33
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wonder whether it is even possible to discern the original meaning they
attached to those adopted provisions. At best, one can try to discern the
original intent of the framers (and the members of the Reid Constitutional
Commission) when the Malaysian Constitution was drafted and adopted, but
it would be a very curious state of affairs for Singaporean judges in modern
independent Singapore to give effect to and be fettered by the original intent
of another nation state’s constitutional framers.37
Second, the Court of Appeal’s originalist mode of interpretation in
Yong Vui Kong is also problematic. The Chief Justice was unwilling to
accept that Article 9(1) could be interpreted to include an implied general
prohibition against inhuman punishment, as the Singapore Government had
unambiguously rejected a proposal by a Constitutional Commission to
amend the Constitution and provide for such an express right in 1969.
However, the Fundamental Liberties Clauses of the Singapore Constitution
came into effect in 1965, the same year Singapore gained independence.
Hence, it is unclear, even based on an originalist understanding of the
Singapore Constitution, whether it was legitimate for the Court to discern
the original intent of the constitutional framers in 1965—when they
imported the applicable Fundamental Liberties Clauses from Malaysia—
from a Parliamentary decision made four years later to reject a proposal that
would have provided for an express prohibition against inhuman
punishment.
Third, even if one assumes that the intent of the constitutional framers
in 1969 in rejecting a constitutional prohibition against inhuman punishment
mirrored a similar intent among the framers in 1965, this would mean that
whatever recommendations the Constitutional Commission made in 1966,
but were not taken up subsequently by the Government in 1969, should also
not be judicially deemed constitutional rights. In particular, the Singapore
Government in 1969 also refused to enact a proposed constitutional
amendment that would have expressly prohibited the use of torture in
Singapore. Fortunately for Singapore, however, the Court of Appeal proved
unwilling to take its own argument to its logical conclusion. As observed by
the Chief Justice, “this conclusion does not mean that, because the proposed
[constitutional amendment] included a prohibition against torture, an Act of
Parliament that permits torture can form part of ‘law’ for the purposes of

37
For a fuller discussion of this case, see Po Jen Yap, Constitutionalising Capital Crimes: Judicial
Virtue or Originalism Sin?, SING. J.L. STUD. 281 (2011).
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Art[icle] 9(1).” 38 Whilst one should certainly applaud this judicial
concession, this pronouncement is very puzzling. As a matter of logic, if the
Chief Justice was reluctant to expand, via an interpretive exercise, the scope
of Article 9(1) to include a constitutional prohibition against inhuman
punishment because Parliament had deliberately refused to confer this
constitutional provision expressly, surely this reasoning must also bar any
elevation of a prohibition against torture to a constitutional right. After all,
this proposal was deliberately rejected by the Government in 1969. The
Court of Appeal interestingly justified this distinction on the basis that the
Singapore Minister of Home Affairs in 1987 had explicitly recognized that
torture was wrong 39 and that torture, insofar as it caused harm to another’s
body with criminal intent, had already been criminalized under the
Singapore Penal Code. 40 With respect, the logic of this argument eludes me.
One must wonder how a mere statement from the Home Minister during
Parliamentary Debates in 1987 would license the Court of Appeal, in an
originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution, to elevate a
prohibition against torture into a constitutional right. Additionally, the fact
that bodily assault is a crime in Singapore would surely not have any bearing
on this matter. Perhaps the Chief Justice was a “faint-hearted originalist”
and Singapore’s constitutional jurisprudence will be better for it. 41
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal, whilst recognizing that Article 9(1)
prohibits torture, went on to state unequivocally that “currently, no domestic
legislation permits torture,” thereby insulating all current official state
practices from challenges on this ground, and in particular judicial caning, a
commonplace punishment for vandalism and rape in Singapore. 42
Judicial reliance on originalism persisted in Lim Meng Suang v.
Attorney General, where the Singapore Court of Appeal upheld a
constitutional challenge brought against Section 377A of the Penal Code,
which criminalizes any act of gross indecency between men, even where the
conduct is consensual and performed in the privacy of one’s home. 43 The
plaintiffs were two gay partners who argued that the impugned provision
violated their right to equality, as protected under Article 12 of the
38

Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [75].
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 July 1987) vol. 49 at cols 1491–92 (Prof. S.
Jayakumar, Minister for Home Affairs).
40
Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [75].
41
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1988–1989).
42
Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [75].
43
Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney General [2014] SING. C.A. at [53]. Same-sex intercourse between
women was legislatively omitted.
39
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Singapore Constitution. 44 According to the Court of Appeal, the applicants’
constitutional right to equality was not violated. In particular, the Court held
that, during constitutional adjudication, “the duty of a court is to interpret
statutes enacted by the legislature; it cannot amend or modify statutes.” 45
Since the legislative objective of Section 377A when it was introduced into
colonial Singapore by the British in 1938 was to criminalize grossly indecent
acts between men, even in private, 46 there was a rational relation between
the legislative differentia embodied in Section 377A and the object of the
law. 47 Arguably, the Court was appealing to an originalist
understanding of the equal protection clause in Singapore’s Constitution.
Given that Singapore’s equal protection clause would not have been
originally understood in 1965—when the Constitution entered into force—to
prohibit the criminalization of same-sex intercourse between men, the court
could not give this constitutional clause an “updated” reading, and declare
this law a breach of equal protection in 2013.
However, even if a state practice, such as the criminalization of
sodomy or the use of capital punishment, was generally accepted at the time
the constitutional provisions were adopted, this does not establish that the
framers intended to constitutionalize that statutory practice for subsequent
generations to obey. It is equally possible that the framers had given little
thought to that issue, or were divided on the issue and preferred to let future
generations decide the matter for themselves. This interpretation is also
more consistent with a textual reading of the constitutional provisions. The
Singapore framers, like framers of other national constitutions, have used
both specific and broad provisions within the constitutional text, thus
indicating that separate clauses should be interpreted at different levels of
generality. Where the framers wanted the constitutional clauses to be read
strictly, they used very specific and particular words. For example, a
member of the Singapore Parliament must be “of the age of 21 years or
above.” 48 The Singapore Constitution does not say that a Member of
Parliament must be of sufficient maturity or age. Similarly, the Singapore
Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the
date of its first sitting and shall then stand dissolved. 49 The Constitution
44
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art. 12(1) (“All persons are equal before
the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”).
45
Lim Meng Suang, SING. C.A. 53 at [77].
46
Id. at [135].
47
Id. at [153].
48
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art. 44(2)(b).
49
Id. art 65(4).
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does not say that the Singapore Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall
continue for a reasonable period of years and shall then stand dissolved.
Given that the Singapore framers intentionally left the constitutional
provisions enshrining terms like “in accordance with law” or “equal
protection” ambiguously worded, fully comprehending that the language
was not specific and could be interpreted in various ways, the choice to
adopt a broader principle must thus be respected. After all, if a prohibition’s
reach is restricted to the practices that were thought to run afoul of the
Constitution at the time the provisions were adopted, it would leave no room
for reasoned adjudication of new practices that scientific and technological
advancements or changed socio-economic circumstances bring about. 50
Thus, such broadly phrased constitutional clauses must embody abstract
principles rather than merely encapsulate and enshrine historical practices.
As Professor Jack Balkin has observed: “[Constitutional adopters]
choose vague standards or abstract principles because they want to channel
political judgment but delegate the task of construction and application to
future generations.” 51
Fidelity to the Constitution requires judges to respect the framers’
choice of rules or standards in the bill of rights. Instead, the Singapore
judiciary has placed dispositive weight on the expectations of the
constitutional framers in deciding whether an impugned legislation is
constitutional. Such attempts to shackle the Constitution to the framers’
original, specific interpretation of the text (as “hard originalism” would
require) may indeed be inconsistent with their original intent of using vague,
open-textured language to enact an enduring instrument with standards that
allow future generations of lawmakers and judges to design and build over
time through the processes of constitutional construction. 52
Therefore, it is evident that judicial recourse to “hard originalism” in
Singapore is not mandated by the text or history of the country’s supreme
law. Rather, it is a consequence of the judiciary’s deliberate choice to defer
to the contemporary policy choices of the dominant People’s Action Party
(PAP) government, which has ruled Singapore without interruption since the
nation’s independence and has not taken kindly to robust judicial review.
50
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Id. at 815–16.

434

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 3

Originalism, as practiced in Singapore, is at heart a rhetorical mask to
disguise judicial passivity and constitutional history that has been relied
upon as a “convenient proxy” for judicial inaction. 53
iii.

Textualism

Textualism is an interpretive method that allows judges to derive the
meaning of the Constitution from its language, as situated within the
linguistic practice of the community and alongside accepted canons of
interpretation. Proponents of textualism, like advocates of “hard
originalism,” argue that the role of a judge is merely to interpret the law, as
enacted by the legislature. In their view, the word “interpret” is a transitive
verb; that is, judges must interpret text. 54 If judges were to depart from the
text of the Constitution, they would be imposing prescriptions that have not
been endorsed by the political process on society.
An excellent illustration of textualism in practice would be the High
Court of Singapore’s decision in Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home
Affairs. 55 In that case, three applicants commenced proceedings seeking
declarations that the Police Commissioner had acted unlawfully in ordering
them to disperse when they engaged in a peaceful protest outside a
government building. A central issue was whether the Miscellaneous
Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act could validly curtail their right to
assemble. The High Court acknowledged that every Singapore citizen has
the right to assemble peaceably, but the learned judge noted that Article 14(2)
of the Singapore Constitution also qualifies this right by allowing the
government to impose “such restrictions as it considers necessary or
expedient in the interest of . . . public order.” Notably, the High Court
observed as follows:
It bears emphasis that the phrase ‘necessary or expedient’
confers on Parliament an extremely wide discretionary power
and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach
towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of
the Constitution . . . there can be no questioning of whether the
legislation is ‘reasonable.’ All that needs to be established is a
53
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nexus between the object of the impugned law and one of the
permissible subjects stipulated in Art[icle] 14(2) of the
Constitution. 56
Simply put, the High Court of Singapore was arguing that the literal
text of the Singapore Constitution did not authorize the judiciary to examine
the reasonableness of the impugned legislative measure. According to the
learned judge, the constitutional right to free speech and assembly in
Singapore is expressly qualified such that the government may impose “such
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient.” 57 Given that the terms
“reasonable” and “expedient” are used disjunctively, the court concluded
there was no need for the courts to examine whether the impugned
legislation is reasonable at all. Mere legislative expedience would suffice to
justify the passage of any rights-infringing law on free assembly.
Lest one think that textualism is an interpretive method that is merely
employed by conservative judges, it is interesting that textual arguments
have been equally deployed by judges in Hong Kong for liberal causes. In
Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, the Hong Kong C.F.A. had to
determine the validity of a statutory provision that prevented Chinese
citizens, born in Hong Kong to Mainland Chinese parents, from being
conferred the constitutional right of permanent residency in Hong Kong at
the time of their birth. 58 In interpreting Article 24(2)(1) 59 of the Basic Law,
the constitutional provision at issue, the Hong Kong Government wanted the
Court to uphold the impugned immigration legislation on the basis that it
was consistent with the view expressed in various extrinsic legislative aids,
including the Preparatory Committee of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region’s Opinions. 60 Nevertheless, the C.F.A. unanimously
rejected this view.
As observed by Chief Justice Li on behalf of the Court: “[T]he courts
are bound to give effect to the clear meaning of the (constitutional) language.
The courts will not on the basis of any extrinsic materials depart from that
56
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clear meaning and give the language a meaning which the language cannot
bear.” 61 Given that the Basic Law explicitly provides “permanent residents
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be . . . Chinese
citizens born in Hong Kong,” the C.F.A. could seize upon the express
phraseology of the constitutional text and reject the use of extrinsic
legislative materials to aid its interpretation, ruling boldly in favor of the
claimants. In so doing, the CFA also cunningly avoided having to give legal
effect to extrinsic materials issued by the Central Government in Beijing
after the promulgation of the Basic Law.
Judicial application of textualism in both cases is not without
problems. In Singapore, where parliamentary supremacy was expressly
rejected in favor of a post-independence constitutional arrangement that
places fundamental rights beyond the reach of majoritarian politics, it is
logically inconceivable that the constitutional right to free assembly can be
circumvented merely when it is expedient for the government of the day to
override it. Even if one is an ardent textualist, one may note that the
absurdity doctrine is a well-accepted canon of interpretation. As Lord
Wensleydale observed in the 1857 decision Grey v. Pearson:
[I]n construing . . . all written instruments, the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case, the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be avoided,
so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. 62
This, in essence, echoes Blackstone’s observation that “where words
bear . . . a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little
deviate from the received sense of them.” 63 Therefore, in Chee Siok Chin, it
would have been perfectly plausible, even as a textualist, for the learned
judge to apply the absurdity doctrine and hold that the Singapore
Constitution only authorizes Parliament to pass such legislative restrictions
that are necessary and expedient in the interest of public order. Otherwise,
any ordinary legislation that Parliament passes to further public order may
61
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automatically trump the constitutionally enshrined right to free assembly.
By reading the words “necessary” and “expedient” conjunctively, rather than
disjunctively, the court would have corrected an obviously absurd and
unintended interpretation that would allow an exception to swallow the
constitutional rule that seeks to safeguard citizens’ fundamental freedoms.
The key feature of textualism, as applied in the Chin Siok Chin decision, is
that it allows judges to focus on the literal language of the constitutional text,
narrow the range of decisional opportunities open to them, and leave it to the
legislature to make any changes to the impugned legislation.
On the other hand, in the Hong Kong C.F.A. decision Chong Fung
Yuen, textualism was deployed to serve progressive causes, but the court’s
denial of choice in the matter was equally disingenuous. Even though the
text of the Basic Law expressly provides that permanent residents of the
H.K.S.A.R. shall be Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong, constitutional
rights in Hong Kong (or elsewhere) are rarely upheld as absolute trumps. 64
Therefore, it would be wholly possible for the C.F.A. to have devised a
doctrinal test to examine whether it was reasonable to exclude Chinese
citizens, who are born in Hong Kong but to non-Hong Kong Permanent
Residents, from being conferred the right of abode at the time of their birth.
By purporting to apply a textual reading of Article 24, the C.F.A. sought to
insulate itself from any public outrage the judges were deliberately
conferring upon children born to Mainland Chinese tourists, illegal
immigrants, or over-stayers, the constitutional right of permanent residency
at the time of their birth in Hong Kong.
The appeal of textualism is that it allows judges to defend the legal
result they hope to achieve by disguising their choice “in the language of
definitional inexorability.” 65 This “our Constitution made us do it”
argument allows judges to deny that they have other options in the matter,
and obfuscates questions on how the judicial decision was made and whether
it could have been made differently. 66 But the reality is there is almost
always an alternative reading of the Constitution the court wants to disavow,
but the Court pretends it does not exist.
64
For example, the Hong Kong C.F.A. has applied the proportionality doctrine to assess legislative
restrictions on the constitutional right to equality (Secretary for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, [2007] 3
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Symbolic Review

In a democratic state committed to constitutional supremacy,
judges are generally vested with the power to invalidate legislation that is
deemed inconsistent with enshrined fundamental liberties. In principle,
constitutional review serves as a counter-majoritarian check against popular
will as expressed in legislation. Yet in Singapore and Malaysia, as discussed
above, the courts operate within an illiberal political system with a dominant
ruling government that has been able to displace constitutional decisions and
even oust judges with remarkable ease. In theory, these courts are supposed
to stand as bulwarks against any governmental incursion into individual
liberties. In reality, however, the judiciary has engaged in constitutional
review that is merely cursory in nature. Formally, judges are committed to
the separation of powers, and as a matter of rhetoric they openly proclaim
that they will always generously interpret constitutional rights. 67
Nonetheless, in practice judges in Malaysia and Singapore have engaged in a
merely symbolic review of state action, for fear of reversals or reprisals.
In Malaysia, since the Constitutional Crisis of 1988, which saw the
removal of the Lord President and another Supreme Court Justice, the
Federal Court (the nation’s court of final resort) has stopped exercising its
prerogative to invalidate legislation deemed incompatible with the nation’s
constitutional bill of rights. 68
Recently, in the ostensibly landmark Malaysian Trade Union
Congress v. Menteri Tenaga decision, 69 the Federal Court of Malaysia held
that an applicant, in the context of public interest litigation (P.I.L.), merely
had to show that he or she had a “real and genuine interest in the subject
matter.” 70 In so doing, the court overruled longstanding precedent that
required applicants to establish the infringement of a private right or the
suffering of special damages before they would have standing for P.I.L.
67
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cases. 71 In this instance, the Malaysian federal government (the Selangor
state government) and a consortium had entered into a tri-partite Agreement
allowing the consortium to raise tariffs on the water it was supplying by 15%
if certain performance targets were met. The Malaysian Trade Union
Congress, a society of trade unions, applied for judicial review when the
Government refused to disclose a copy of the Agreement and the Audit
Report that justified an increase in water tariffs. While the Federal Court
laudably agreed that the Trade Congress had the locus standi to bring
judicial review proceedings against the government, the Court quickly
dashed all hopes that it was remotely interested in providing any substantive
relief. The Court held the Audit Report could not be disclosed, as it was
tabled and deliberated in a Cabinet meeting and was therefore an “official
secret.” 72 As for the Agreement, the Court held it could not be disclosed
because it contained a non-disclosure clause forbidding dissemination to
third parties without prior mutual agreement between the parties.73 It would
appear then that the “liberalizing” effect of this new locus standi rule would
have a negligible impact on the substantive development of P.I.L. actions in
Malaysia. In the future, the government would merely need to table any
documents for the Cabinet’s deliberation to make them immune from
disclosure. Similarly, private actors merely had to sign non-disclosure
agreements to foil any third-party attempts at discovery. Therefore, any
hopes for change in this area are illusory.
In the same vein, in Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney General, the
Singapore Court of Appeal rightly accepted that the clemency power
exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers vis-à-vis a prisoner on death row was
subject to judicial review. 74 More importantly, the court held that if
“conclusive evidence is produced to the court to show that the Cabinet never
met to consider the offender’s case at all, or that the Cabinet did not consider
the [clemency] materials before it and merely tossed a coin” to determine the
matter, the government would be in breach. 75 But one must note the limited
scope of the court’s review of the offender’s clemency petition in practice.
For example, the Court of Appeal subsequently went on to hold that the
offender had no right to petition for clemency, had no right to be heard
during the clemency process, and had no right to see the clemency materials
71
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placed before the Cabinet. 76 If this is so, one does wonder how, in practice,
the offender would ever prove with “conclusive evidence” that the Cabinet
had never met to discuss his or her case, let alone find out that the Ministers
had tossed a coin to decide the matter. Unless there is a whistleblower,
privy to the Cabinet’s deliberations (or lack thereof), who is willing to come
forward, the likelihood that any such constitutional review is taking place in
Singapore is imaginary at best. 77 As Professor Michael Hor rightly laments,
“the door [to judicial review of the clemency power] is open, but the crack is
too small for anyone to pass through.” 78
Singapore and Malaysia have a semi-permanent form of government
in power, and where a dominant, disciplined political party or coalition is in
control, the less space domestic courts have to operate. 79 Where legislative
and executive power is consolidated in a single party or coalition, the
dominant government can display its displeasure more easily by eliminating
judicial review or even ousting the judges themselves. Constitutional review
does not operate in a political vacuum; where judges are significantly
constrained by the actions of other political actors, judicial review of state
action becomes merely an exercise in tokenism.
C.

Vacuous Judicial Doctrines

The converse of symbolic review is the judicial creation of vacuous
doctrines that mask robust intervention under the guise of constitutional
interpretation. This article focuses on arguably the most vacuous of such
judicial doctrines, the implied “basic structure” doctrine, wherein the
judiciary determines the unwritten “essential features” of the Constitution
that are beyond any formal constitutional change. 80 Within Asia, the more
active courts in India and Taiwan have enforced this “basic structure”
doctrine by imposing implied constraints on the substantive content of
76
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constitutional amendments and have invalidated any offending constitutional
amendments for perceived violations.
In Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, the Supreme Court of India, by a
7-to-6 majority, invalidated part of the 25th Amendment of the Indian
Constitution, which provided that any law passed with a declaration that it
was intended to give effect to the Directive Principles on the state’s socioeconomic policy could not be “called in question in any court on the ground
that it does not give effect to such policy.” 81 The majority judges argued
that such an amendment attempted to eliminate judicial review and thus
violated an implied “essential feature” of the Indian Constitution, and was
therefore unconstitutional. Since Kesavananda, the Supreme Court of India
has invalidated constitutional amendments on four other occasions for
violating the Constitution’s implied basic structure. 82 Similarly, in J.Y.
Interpretation No. 499, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan invalidated a
constitutional amendment enacted by the Taiwanese National Assembly (an
unelected legislative branch of government), which sought to extend its own
term of office by allowing political parties with seats in the Legislative Yuan
(Taiwan’s primary legislative chamber) to “elect” delegates to the Assembly.
The impugned constitutional amendment was declared inconsistent with
democracy and human rights principles, fundamental norms that were
deemed part of the implied “unchangeable provisions” in the Taiwanese
Constitution. 83
Upon close examination, judicial enforcement of the implied
“essential features” doctrine nevertheless raises particular questions. Given
that the texts of these constitutions are silent on which features are so basic
or fundamental that they are beyond abrogation, any judicially created lists
of such norms are open to debate and “cannot be objectively deduced or
passively discerned in a viewpoint-free way.” 84 Even in the Indian
Kesavananda case, judges were not unanimous on which elements would
constitute the basic structure of the Constitution. For example, only four
judges considered secularism as forming part of the unamendable basic
structure in India, while a different plurality of judges viewed the unity and
81
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sovereignty of the nation 85 as a core element. 86 More interestingly, one
Indian judge considered that parliamentary democracy is part of the
Constitution’s implied fundamental features and such a system of
government may not be abrogated via a constitutional amendment. 87 The
difficulty of identifying what exactly are the implied “essential features” of a
constitution was exposed by Ray J. in his dissenting opinion in Kesavananda:
To find out essential or non-essential features is an exercise in
imponderables. When the Constitution does not make any
distinction between essential and non-essential features it is
incomprehensible as to how such a distinction can be made . . .
On what touchstone are the essential features to be measured?
Is there any yardstick by which it can be gauged? 88
Furthermore, even if one accepts that fundamental rights and judicial
review form the inalienable core of any constitutional state committed to the
rule of law, it may not always be self-evident whether an impugned
constitutional amendment violates these norms in the specific disputes
before the court. The trouble with the elusive, divine rule of law ideal is not
that people will disagree with its normative force in the abstract, but that this
higher-order law, if enforceable, must be given substance and applied. 89
Judges do not uphold the rule of law in the abstract, but have to apply the
sacrosanct constitutional norms to particularized facts that come before
them. 90 While unelected judges may stand above the rancor of politics and
are arguably more impartial vis-à-vis the political branches of government, it
is this insulation, as well as the professional homogeneity of the bench, that
limits judges’ access to the requisite empirical evidence they need to make a
fully informed constitutional judgment. Therefore, even if human rights as a
general principle may never be abrogated, it is unclear why judges’
perception of certain constitutional liberties in every concrete context would
always be superior and should always trump the amending body’s
conception each time, such that all constitutional amendments may come
under the pruning knife of judges. Indeed, pursuant to the “basic structure”
doctrine, the scope of the constitutional amendment power is ultimately
85
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circumscribed by what a handful of judges may think constitutes the
Constitution’s proper limits. In reality, the implied “basic structure”
doctrine is no more than a constitutional fig leaf to disguise judges’
unspoken political agenda.
In Taiwan, prior to the issuance of J.Y. Interpretation No. 499,
constitutional amendments could only be proposed and passed by National
Assembly delegates, who were all unelected. The National Assembly was a
political institution that was highly unpopular with the public, as its
existence harkened back to the authoritarian era in Taiwan’s history when
elections were suspended and the term of the delegates extended
indefinitely. 91 The public was clearly in favor of abolishing the National
Assembly and having the Legislative Yuan (the primary legislative chamber)
take over its constitutional functions. In 1999, however, the Assembly
delegates, by anonymous voting, once again passed a constitutional
amendment to prolong their term. In response to the political impasse and to
vindicate popular demand, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan intervened
decisively and ended the National Assembly’s reign in Taiwan. 92
As for India, the “basic structure” doctrine was first conceived and
developed as a judicial response to the legislative excesses of the Indira
Gandhi government, which had relied on a supine Parliament to effect
constitutional changes that the “hyper-executive” government unilaterally
wanted. Following a landslide victory at the 1971 polls, the Congress Party
headed by Indira Gandhi was able to pass constitutional amendments with
remarkable ease. The 25th Amendment was passed to insulate Gandhi’s
socialist policies from judicial review. In response to rising political unrest
after 1973, a State of Emergency was declared in 1975, which led to the
suspension of fundamental rights and the detention of opposition
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politicians. 93 The Constitution was also amended several more times in
quick succession. 94 Specifically, in response to a lower court’s finding that
the Prime Minister had violated electoral laws and was disqualified from
holding public office for six years, the 39th Amendment was passed to
insulate the Prime Minister’s election from judicial inquiry and render
pending proceedings in respect of such elections null and void. 95
Furthermore, the 42nd Amendment made nearly sixty significant changes to
the Indian Constitution, which included an express elimination of judicial
review over constitutional amendments. 96 The judges were convinced that if
they did not intervene, all vestiges of democracy in India would eventually
be removed. 97
These Asian judges, when enforcing the implied “basic structure”
doctrine, would emphatically argue that they are impartially applying predetermined rules, and are constrained by a distinctive methodology of legal
reasoning that is closely tethered to their nation’s Constitution and its
history. 98 Nonetheless, as discussed above, there is no definite way by
which judges can discern and decide what these core features are and
whether they are violated on the facts of a particular case. The doctrine is
inherently vacuous and has been judicially conceived merely as a
mechanism to prevent an authoritarian government from harnessing the
amending process to “extend its own life indefinitely” or to establish
totalitarianism. 99 The sheer attractiveness of this “basic structure” doctrine
(to judges) lies in the fact that it purports to draw authority from the nation’s
foundational instrument and allows judges to sustain the myth that they are
merely fulfilling the mandates of the Constitution, when they are in effect
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unilaterally introducing a political safeguard against legislative worse-case
scenarios.
III.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional fig leaves used by Asian judges seek to obscure the
strategic political choices judges make for both liberal and conservative
causes. In Singapore and Malaysia, where courts are confronted with a
semi-permanent regime in power, reform-minded judges can typically bring
about changes only at “the margins of political life.”100 Though both former
British colonies have retained the Westminster system of government, which
is predicated on the separation of powers, the anemic state of the courts’
jurisprudence suggests that their constitutional bills of rights are no more
than paper tigers. 101 Nevertheless, by deploying legal fig leaves and
maintaining some form of perceived legitimacy, Singaporean and Malaysian
judges passively lend a “gloss of legitimacy to the authoritarian regime of
which they are a part, precisely because they are a part of it.” 102 As for the
liberal courts in India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, these fig leaves provide
constitutional cover for their activism. Insofar as judges purport to draw
authority from the constitutional powers vested by their territory’s supreme
law, they can deflect any criticisms that they have made unwarranted
incursions into the legislative sphere.
So, perhaps, we should not completely chafe against these
constitutional fig leaves, for they do serve an important social function by
preserving judicial legitimacy. 103 The judicial invocation of such fig leaves
allows everyone to keep up appearances. Removing these legal loincloths
would do nothing but reveal to the world the ugly truth of what we already
all know: the emperor really has no clothes. 104 Whether this game is worth
the candle is a discussion we would leave for another day.
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